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Hendry: Search and Seizure

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Wright'
(decided June 4, 2002)
The Warren County Court convicted Donald Wright of
driving while intoxicated, which was a felony. 2 Wright appealed
his conviction, arguing that the traffic violation used to detain him
was a pretext, as the trooper was actually investigating a reckless
driving complaint. 3 Wright claimed his right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, as guaranteed by both the
United States 4 and New York Constitutions, 5 was violated. The
appellate division reversed the
lower court's decision and granted
6
motion.
Wright's suppression
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the appellate
division's conclusion that because the trooper's primary
motivation for stopping Wright's car was not the traffic violation,7
it was insufficient to constitute probable cause for the. stop.
Rather, the Court of Appeals held that because the trooper had
probable cause to believe Wright violated a vehicle and traffic law,
the stop was permissible.8
Wright's arrest resulted from a tip reported to a New York
State Trooper by an unidentified source. 9 The tipster indicated a
red Suzuki was being driven recklessly. 10 The trooper immediately
searched for the car and successfully located the red Suzuki driven
by Wright.1 While pursuing the vehicle, the trooper discovered
that the Suzuki's muffler violated New York State Vehicle and
98 N.Y.2d 657, 773 N.E,2d 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d 273 (2002).
at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.

2 Id.

3id.
4U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.. ..."
' N.Y. CONST. art. I § 12 provides in pertinent part: "The right of the people to

be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ......
6 Wright, 98
7

id.

N.Y.2d at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.

' Id. at 659, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
9 Id. at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
10 Id.
" Wright, 98 N.Y.2d at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 756 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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Traffic Law Section 375(31).12 The trooper stopped the vehicle,
administered a sobriety test that Wright failed, and witnessed
Wright's own admission that he had been drinking. 13 Accordingly,
14
the trooper arrested Wright for driving while intoxicated.
The appellate division reversed Wright's conviction on the
grounds that the trooper used the traffic violation as a pretext to
investigate the reckless driving tip. 15 The court held that it is the

police officer's primary motivation, in this instance the
investigation of the reckless driving tip, that is paramount to
determining whether a stop is lawful. 6 Accordingly, the appellate
division granted Wright's motion to suppress.17
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the appellate division,
holding that the stop was indeed lawful. The trooper did have
probable cause to believe Wright committed a traffic violation, and
the primary motivation of the officer is irrelevant. 18 The Court of
Appeals relied on its decision in People v. Robinson, 19 which was
decided after the appellate division's 20decision in Wright, and
therefore reversed the appellate division.
Robinson is a consolidated action of three cases where the
of
Appeals held that where a police officer believes the
Court
driver committed a traffic violation, the police officer has probable
cause to stop the vehicle even though the vehicle and traffic law
(VTL) violation is merely a pretext to investigate an entirely

12N.Y.

VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 375(31) (McKinney 1992) provides in pertinent

part:
Every motor vehicle, operated or driven upon the highways of
the state, shall at all times be equipped with an adequate
muffler and exhaust system in constant operation and properly
maintained to prevent any excessive or unusual noise and no
such muffler or exhaust system shall be equipped with a cutout, bypass, or similar device.
13 Wright, 98 N.Y.2d at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
14Id.
5 Wright, 286 A.D.2d at 521, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
16

id.

17Id. at

522, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
'" Wright, 98 N.Y.2d at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
'9 97 N.Y.2d 341, 767 N.E.2d 638, 741 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2001).
20 Wright, 98 N.Y.2d at 658, 773 N.E.2d at 1011, 746 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
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unrelated matter. 22Therefore, the subjective intent of the police
officer is irrelevant.
The first of the three cases, People v. Robinson, involved a
stop made by officers from the Mobile Taxi Homicide Task Force
that were on night patrol and assigned to follow taxis to ensure the
drivers were not robbed.23 After observing a vehicle pass through
a red light, the officers pulled over what they believed to be a
livery cab. 24 One of the officers noticed that the passenger,
Robinson, looked back several times. 25 When an officer shined a
flashlight on Robinson, he discovered Robinson was wearing a
bulletproof vest.26 After Robinson was told to get out of the taxi,
the officer discovered a gun on the floor of the vehicle, which was
in close proximity to Robinson's seat.27 Robinson was convicted
of criminal possession of a weapon and unlawfully wearing a
bulletproof vest.28 The decision was unanimously affirmed by the
Appellate Division, Third Department,29 which relied on Whren v.
United States.30 Despite Robinson's argument that the vest and the
gun should have been suppressed because the traffic stop was
merely a pretext the officers employed to justify their search, the
conviction was affirmed.3 '
In the second case, People v. Reynolds, a police officer
observed a prostitute enter Reynolds' truck.32 The officer ran a
21

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 346, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.

22

Id.

23

id.

24

id.

id.
Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 346, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
27
Id. at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
25

26

28

id.

271 A.D.2d 17, 711 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dep't 2000).
517 U.S. 806 (1996). The appellate departments of New York were divided
on this issue prior to the Robinson decision. While the First Department had
relied on Whren in reaching its decision in Robinson, the Third Department in
Wright believed that Whren did not control the analysis. Compare People v.
Glenn, 279 A.D.2d 422, 723 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1st Dep't 2001); People v.
Robinson, 271 A.D.2d 17, 711 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1st Dep't 2000) with People v.
Reynolds, 713 N.Y.S.2d 813, 185 Misc. 2d 674 (County Ct., Monroe County
2000), rev'd, .Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 358, 767 N.E.2d at 648-49, 741 N.Y.S.2d
at 158-59.
33Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 640, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
29

30

32

Id.
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computer search that indicated the truck's registration was expired
and pulled the truck over. 33 Upon discovery of the defendant's
bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and strong smell of alcohol, the
officer conducted several field sobriety tests, most of which
Reynolds failed.34 A blood test administered at the police station
confirmed that Reynolds' blood alcohol level was double the legal
limit. 35 The county court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of
the charges for driving while intoxicated and operating an
unregistered vehicle, concluding that Reynolds' motion to suppress
was properly granted because the traffic violation was a pretext
used to permit the officer to investigate the suspected
prostitution. 36 However, relying on Whren, the Court of Appeals
reversed.37
In People v. Glenn, the third and final case, plain clothes
officers observed a livery cab that turned without signaling. 38 The
officers suspected the cab driver was being robbed because Glenn,
who was sitting in the back seat, leaned forward. 39 Accordingly,
the officers stopped the cab and discovered drugs on the back seat
and on Glenn's person.4 0 Glenn was convicted of criminal
possession of a controlled substance. 4 1 However, he appealed his
conviction arguing the drugs should be suppressed because the
stop of the vehicle was merely a pretext to investigate an unrelated
matter.
Both the appellate division and the Court of Appeals
relied on Whren and affirmed.43
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the
appellate division in Robinson and Glenn, and reversed the
Reynolds decision. 44 The majority emphasized that most of the
states had already either cited with approval or officially adopted
33 id.

34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 347, 767 N.E.2d at 641, 741 N.Y.S.2d
at 150.
"7Id. at 358, 767 N.E.2d at 648-49, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
31

Id. at 347-48, 767 N.E.2d at 641, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 150.

39 id.

40 id.
41

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 347-48, 767 N.E.2d at 641, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 150.

41

Id. at 348, 767 N.E.2d at 641, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 150.

43 Id.

44

Id. at 358, 767 N.E.2d at 648-49, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 158-59.
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the Whren standard.45 The Court of Appeals had never before held
that a pretextual stop was a violation of the New York
Constitution. 46 The court further noted that the real concern
regarding pretextual stops is that they not be performed arbitrarily
and selectively. However, the court noted that this concern is
properly addressed by the Equal Protection Clause 47 of the United
States Constitution.48 Therefore, the court held:
[W]here a police officer has probable cause
to believe that the driver of an automobile has
committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate
article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution.
In making that determination of probable cause,
neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a
determination of what a reasonable traffic officer
would have done under the circumstances is
49
relevant.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals noted that both the
Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York
Constitution have identical language and both confer similar
rights. 50 The court further noted that the alternative reasonable
officer standard advocated by the dissent was not used in any state
court and had been abandoned by the Tenth Circuit after it proved
to be unworkable. 5' It unanimously concluded that such a test
neither is nor52 should be "part of our State constitutional
jurisprudence."
In Robinson, the dissent argued that the Whren standard
inadequately safeguarded the rights accorded by both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the New York
Constitution. 53 They argued that the Whren standard allows any
4

Id. at 349, 767 N.E.2d at 642, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 151.

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 350, 767 N.E.2d at 643, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides in pertinent part: [N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
46

47

Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 351, 767 N.E.2d at 644, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
Id. at 349, 767 N.E.2d at 642, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
50
Id. at 350, 767 N.E.2d at 642, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
"' Id. at 357, 767 N.E.2d at 648, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 157.
52 Id. at 350, 767 N.E.2d at 643, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 152 (Levine, J., dissenting).
53 Robinson, 97 N.Y.2d at 360, 767 N.E.2d at 650, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 159.
48

49
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officer to make an unjustified stop by merely searching through the
Vehicle and Traffic Law for some violation to use as a pretext to
justify the stop. 54 The dissenters argued for an objective
reasonable officer standard, one focused on the question of
whether "a reasonable officer assigned to Vehicle and Traffic Law
enforcement in the seizing officer's department [would] have made
the stop under the circumstances presented, absent a purpose to
55
investigate serious criminal activity of the vehicle's occupants."
The appellate divisions have had several occasions to apply
the Robinson decision. For instance, in People v. Park, the Fourth
Department upheld the defendant's conviction for criminal
possession of a controlled substance. 56 Park argued that the
evidence should be suppressed because his vehicle was stopped
under the pretext of violation of seatbelt regulations. 57 Similarly,
the First Department invoked the Robinson standard in People v.
Webb.5" In that case, officers stopped a taxi cab that Webb was a
passenger in and discovered the defendant's drug paraphernalia.59
The federal courts follow the standard set forth in Wfhren v.
United States.6
"hren involved a conviction for violation of
6
1
federal drug laws. In Whren, the Supreme Court held that a stop
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it is made on the
basis of violation of the traffic code, regardless of the subjective
intent of the officer.62 While patrolling an area known for high
drug activity, officers noticed a car sitting at a stop sign for a
prolonged period of time. 63 The officers noticed that the driver
was looking down at the passenger's lap. 64 When the police car
returned to investigate, the vehicle made a sudden right turn
without signaling and sped away. 65 After following the vehicle for
Id. at 373, 767 N.E.2d at 660, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 169.
" Id. at 371-72, 767 N.E.2d at 659, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 168.
14

56 294 A.D.2d 887, 888, 741 N.Y.S.2d 824, 825 (4 th Dep't 2002).
57

id.

"B2 9 1 A.D.2d 319, 737 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1st Dep't 2002).
59

id.

U.S. at 806.
Id. at 809.
62 Id. at 813.
63 Id. at 808.
64
id.
65 Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
60
517
61
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a short time, the officers approached it and saw Whren holding two
large bags that apparently contained drugs. 66 Both Whren and the
driver,
Brown, were arrested and drugs were discovered in the
7
car.

6

At the pretrial suppression hearing, the defendants argued
that the stop lacked the requisite probable cause because it was
pretextual.6 8 However, that argument was rejected and the motion
was denied. 69 Both defendants were convicted, and the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed on the basis that the
stop was permissible and the officers' subjective intent was
70
irrelevant because the driver had violated a traffic regulation.
The Supreme Court affirmed, unanimously holding "[s]ubjective
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment7 1 analysis," provided that the officer's actions are
reasonable.
The Whren defendants argued that a police officer may use
any technical violation of the vehicle and traffic law to justify a
stop.72 Additionally, they argued that allowing stops to be made
under such pretenses would allow officers to stop motorists on
such impermissible factors as race.73 The defendants argued for
the use of a subjective standard that focuses on whether a
reasonable police officer would make the stop for the reasons
provided.74
The Court rejected the defendants' arguments. First, it
noted that it did not know of any principle allowing courts to
identify or determine which of the large number of traffic
regulations that police officers had to choose from should be
enforced or disregarded. 75 As for the defendants' argument
regarding racial considerations, the Court indicated that the Equal
Protection Clause, rather than the Fourth Amendment was the
66
67

Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 809.

68 id.

Id.
Whren, 517 U.S. at 809.
71 Id. at 813.
72 Id. at 810.
69

70

73 Id.
74 Id.
71

Whren, 517 U.S. at 818-19.
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vehicle to address such claims. 76 Lastly, the Court rejected the
subjective test posited by the defendants. The Court noted that it
has never held in circumstances such as this "that an officer's
motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
contrary." 77 The Court also indicated that although every Fourth
Amendment case involves the necessity of balancing the relevant
factors to determine the reasonableness of the act in question,
when the search or seizure is based on probable cause the
balancing is not an issue. 78 Therefore, the Court affirmed on the
basis of the district court's finding that the officers had probable
cause to believe the defendants had violated a traffic regulation,
and the resulting stop was therefore reasonable and in accordance
with Fourth Amendment requirements regardless of the subjective
intent of the police officer.79
Federal courts hold that provided there is probable cause
for the officer to believe that a traffic violation has occurred, it is
not a violation of.the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution to effectuate a stop even if the officer's motive is to
investigate something other than the traffic violation. Similarly,
New York courts also hold such a stop is not a violation of Article
I, Section 12 of the New York Constitution. In this context, both
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution provide
the same rights.
Melanie Hendry

76 Id.
at 813.
77 Id. at 812.
7
1Id.at 817.
79
1Id.at 819.
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